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policy does not contain the broad and ambiguous promise to defend,
heavily relied upon by Gray, nor does the doctrine of contracts of ad-
hesion apply without question to the lender's policy.
The ALTA has been aware of judicial criticisms of insurance policies,
and the recently drafted ALTA Policies of 1970, the Owner's Policies
(Forms A and B), the Loan Policy, and the new Single Form Policy
reflect an attempt to anticipate these criticisms. The revisions attempt
to clarify possible ambiguities in the form of the policies, rather than limit
coverage. All the policies expand and make more conspicuous the insuring
clauses to include immediately reference to the exclusions from coverage.
The purpose behind this revision is to thwart the possible judicial ruling
that the fine print of an exlusionary clause is inconsistent with the bold
print promising to insure, with the result that the exclusionary clause
is ignored.30 The 1970 ALTA Loan Policy and the 1970 Single Form
Policy continue to contain the provision terminating the insurer's liability
when there is payment in ful3 7 but the provision is under the subheading
"Reduction of Liability" rather than under the subheading found to be
ambiguous in Paramount, "Payment of Loss."3" The 1970 ALTA
Policies generally define the purpose and the scope of the coverage with
more exactness. At any rate, the scope of the coverage as well as the
form of the policy of title insurance for the lender are not controlled by
the individual title insurance companies to the extent that a court should
mechanically resolve ambiguities it might find in even revised policies in
favor of the lending institution.
CHRISTIAN NESS
Labor Law-The Right to an Unbiased Tribunal in Union
Disciplinary Proceedings
A significant weakness in union disciplinary procedure has been the
"All of the 1970 ALTA Policies contain as the first sentence of the policy
the following provision: "SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COV-
ERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE B AND
THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS HERE-
OF .... "
"' ALTA LOAN PoLIcY-1970 para. 8; ALTA SINGLE FoRm PoLIcy-1970 para.
8.
"" 1 Cal. 3d at 569-70, 363 P.2d at 571, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
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composition and operation of the "union tribunal."1 At common law most
courts required that a union member be given a "fair hearing" before
serious disciplinary sanctions could be invoked,2 with the majority rule
being that a union member was entitled to a hearing whether provided
for in the union's constitution or not.3 By the enactment of the "Bill of
Rights" 4 as part of the Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act
of 1959,' Congress codified the requirement of a "full and fair hearing,"
making it mandatory in all internal disciplinary procedures." Choosing
not to specify standards or even guidelines with respect to a full and fair
hearing, Congress left it to the judiciary to hammer out the constituents.
The "fair hearing" in labor law has generally embraced several elements
closely resembling those of constitutional due process including full notice,
the right to present evidence and to confront and cross examine witnesses.
Another requisite of the full and fair hearing is that the accused be tried
before an "impartial" tribunal.' For a variety of reasons the "unbiased"
trial body has proved the most difficult of the due process requirements to
attain. The failure stems both from dichotomous goals set by Congress
and institutional peculiarities of labor unions themselves. While the
"Bill of Rights" was envisioned as a body of law that would compel
unions, when dealing with their own members, to follow democratic pro-
cedures, built into the legislation was the competing goal of developing
IAaron, The Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HtAv.
L. Rzv. 851, 874 (1960).
'Parks v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963).
' Comment, Substantive and Procedural Due Process in Union Disciplinary
Proceedings, 3 U. SAN F AN. L. Rlv. 389, 400 (1969).
"The Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations, 29 U.S.C. §411
(1964).
Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-
02, 411-15, 431-40, 461-66, 481-83, 501-04, 521-31 (1964) (hereinafter cited as
LMRDA).
'LMRDA § 101(a) (5), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (5) (1964) provides:
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled,
or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization
or by any officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with
written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his de-
fense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing.
" Specific provision for a union member's access to the courts was made in
LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1964):
Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter
have been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil
action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including
injunctions) as may be appropriate.
8 Parks v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 314 F.2d 886, 912 (4th Cir.
1963).
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strong, independent organs of self-government within unions so that
governmental intervention would be minimal.9 These worthy but some-
times conflicting objectives, combined with the institutional traits of the
American union, have made it difficult for courts to delineate adequate
standards for the unbiased trial.'
While there are a number of cases dealing with general due process
standards as applied to disciplinary trials, very few deal directly with
impartiality of the trial body per se. The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has recently decided an intra-union disciplinary case, Falcone v.
Dantine," which bears directly on the "unbiased tribunal" issue. On
Janaury 4, 1967, James Falcone, a member of the International Brother-
hood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Forgers & Helpers, Local Lodge
802, allegedly encouraged fellow members not to return to work at a
dry dock company. He was also accused of harassing and physically
threatening union officials. 2 Falcone was charged with violating three
provisions of the union constitution 13 and then notified of the union's
' LMRDA § 101 (a) (4), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4) (1964) provides for exhaustion
of internal remedies before a member may rely on the courts. It provides in part:
No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to
institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative
agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organization or its officers
are named as defendants or respondents in such action or proceeding ...
Provided, That any such member be required to exhaust reasonable hearing
procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such orga-
nization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such
organizations or any officer thereof: ....
In a recent case the Third Circuit has described the objective of this section:
The proviso . . . reflects an effort to encourage mature, democratic self
government of labor organizations through the development of internal pro-
cedures for the correction of abuses by union officials and at the same time
provide reasonably expeditious judicial relief to union members who have
been denied the fundamental rights guaranteed by Title I of the LMRDA.
Harris v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n Local 1291, 321 F.2d 801 (3d Cir.
1963).
"0 See, e.g., Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in
Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 200 (1960).
11420 F.2d 1157 (3d Cir. 1969), as amended on denial of rehearing (1970).
12Falcone v. Dantinne, 288 F. Supp. 719, 722 (E.D. Pa. 1968), rev'd, 420 F.2d
1157 (3d Cir. 1970). These events took place after the union's officials had reached
a "tentative" accord with management and had ordered the men to return to work.
Falcone's defense was that the membership had mandated a strike unless a firm
agreement was reached by January 4, 1967. Id. at 724-25.
" The specific provisions of art. XVII, § 1 of the constitution that Falcone was
charged with violating are the following:
(e) engaging in any activity or course of conduct detrimental to the
welfare or best interest of the International Brotherhood or of a subordinate
body;
(k) engaging in or fomenting any acts or course of conduct which are
inconsistent with the duties, obligations and fealty of the members of a trade
(Vol. 49
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constitutionally required "informal hearing."1 4 Attempts to reach agree-
ment failed, necessitating a formal hearing before the trial body, a panel
comprised of three officers, excluding charging or other directly involved
parties, who were chosen by all of the elected officers.'- All three of the
members selected had attended and actively participated in the prior
informal hearing."0 The union's trial body heard the evidence, judged
Falcone guilty and expelled him from the union for five years. On appeal
to the international, the judgment was affirmed, but the punishment
modified to five years suspension.1
7
Falcone sought an injunction in the district court' to prevent the
union from depriving him of membership, the right to hold office or
from any other union right. He argued that the union had violated the
"fair hearing" provision of the LMRDA, 9 alleging that at least one of
the members of the trial board had prejudged his guilt at the informal
hearing.20 He also asserted that the mere presence of the other two
union and which violate sound trade union principles or which constitute a
breach of any existing collective bargaining agreement;
(m) threatening with violence or assaulting any union member or officer.
420 F.2d at 1159.
"'A portion of art. XVII, § 2(b) provides:
After receiving .. . formal charges, the Local Lodge President or the
International President, will within fourteen (14) days, set up an informal
hearing between the parties directly involved and a sincere effort will be
made to resolve the matter at this point.
420 F.2d at 1160.
1 Id.
"0 Art. XVII, § 3 (a) states that
[The] trial body of the Local Lodge shall consist of a panel of three of
the elected officers of such lodge as decided by the elected officers. No
charging or other directly involved parties shall sit as a member of
the trial body, and any member of a trial body may be challenged for
cause, and, if the trial body finds cause to exist, such member shall fill
such vacancy by appointment. In the event such vacancy cannot be filled
by a Local Lodge officer, the Local Lodge shall elect from among the
members of the Local Lodge to fill such vacancy.
420 F.2d at 1161.
"' 288 F. Supp. at 724. "Suspension" results in a temporary release of benefits
and rights while "expulsion" results in a total surrender of the member's status-
a severing of all connections between the member and the union. 420 F.2d at 1159
n.2 . It has been observed that loss of membership can have disastrous repercussions
including loss of one's job as well as loss of benefits accruing from retirement and
medical plans. Comment, Substantive and Procedural Due Process in Union Dis-
ciplinary Proceedings, 3 U. SAN FRAx. L. REv. 389 (1969).
18 See note 7 supra.
"This section guarantees a "full and fair hearing." See note 6 supra.
0 Philip News, the chairman of the Trial Body, and one of the officers who par-
ticipated in the informal hearing, made the following statement in response to
Falcone's counsel in the district court:
1970]
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members of the trial board at the informal hearing constituted bias.21
The district court, finding no bias, affirmed the holding of the trial body
and dismissed the complaint.22 The court of appeals reversed and held
that since one member of the trial board had prejudged the case, Falcone
was not afforded the "full and fair hearing" guaranteed by the LMRDA.
23
Falcone demonstrates the difficulties that courts have experienced in
trying to infuse due process principles into the union trial apparatus. The
court suggested two standards for combatting bias in union tribunals.
Judge Stahl, writing for the court, reiterated what is the most prevalent
standard among the judiciary-that specific bias must be proven before a
court will overturn a union tribunal.2" In an opinion concurring with the
court's result, Judge Freedman posited a second standard:
The circumstances themselves create the inherent impropriety ... [I]
disagree with the view which would require of an aggrieved party
concrete proof of bias or prejudgment, because I think there is inherent
in any participation in the informal hearing a disqualification against
acting as a member of the Trial Body.25
[During the informal hearing] [v]e asked Mr. Falcone to simply admit
his guilt because it was obvious that it appeared by the evidence that he was
guilty by all evidence possible, and that if he were to admit his guilt and
save us all the necessity of a trial, of a hearing, that the penalty in all
likelihood would be much lighter than possibly what it might be if we went
to trial, went to hearing.
420 F.2d at 1161.
" 288 F. Supp. at 727. Falcone argued further that all of the witnesses against
him were either union officers or related to union officers who were "predisposed"
to a finding of guilt. Id. at 725.
"'Id. at 728.
2 420 F.2d at 1167.
2"420 F.2d at 1160-61. The judge also stated:
Nor do we see any inherent impropriety in having a union officer who at-
tends and participates in the informal meeting subsequently sit as a member
of the Trial Body and as a finder of fact at a formal hearing provided
there is no element of bias or prejudgment.
Id. Judge Stahl explicitly recognized that Congress had left a void and that
standards would have to be supplied (if at all) by the courts. To emphasize its
point the court quoted from Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers Local 107 v.
Cohen, 182 F. Supp. 608, 617 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd per curianm, 284 F.2d 162 (3d Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 83-3 (1961) which referred to another section, § 501,
of the same act:
Congress made no attempt to "codify" the law in this area. It appears evident
to us that they intended the federal courts to fashion a new federal labor law
in this area, in much the same way that the federal courts have fashioned
a new substantive law of collective bargaining contracts under § 301 (a) of
the Taft-Hartley Act. In undertaking this task the federal courts will
necessarily rely heavily on the common law of the various states.
Id. at 1165 (citations omitted).
211420 F.2d at 1168.
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Freedman's opinion suggests that a showing of actual bias does not solve
the fundamental problem of "inherent bias," a product of "the circum-
stances themselves." Implicit in his reasoning is the notion that unless
courts can eradicate built-in, institutional bias, often hidden from view,
it is a fallacy to believe that the judiciary can effect impartiality.
The fact that the court in Falcone decided such bias constituted a
violation of the "fair hearing" right represents no departure in the law.26
Nor is it startling that the disciplinary hearing should comport with
rudimentary due process.2 7 What is obvious in Falcone is that the court
found a convenient flaw in the trial procedure-prejudgment-obviating
the necessity of having to effect a change in the union's organic institu-
tions.2" Such circumvention seemingly forwards the policies of union
self-development and governmental non-intervention as Congress intended,
but because courts hold so narrowly on procedural points there is a dearth
of procedural guidelines.29 Also evident in Falcone and in most dis-
ciplinary cases having political overtones is the unwillingness of the courts
to reach the subtler bias built into the procedure itself.30
An example of such illusory bias is the merging of prosecutorial and
adjudicating functions which is common in many unions. 31 In Parks v.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers32 the international re-
voked a local's charter for having participated in a strike without its
authorization. The union's constitution vested in the international's
president combined prosecuting and judicial functions. In executing his
duties the president ordered the charges to be brought, then conferred
with the union's general counsel in the preparation of the revocation
order, and ultimately ordered the local's charter revoked.3 The court
stated that while it might be desirable to adopt procedures that keep trial
" See, e.g., Gulickson v. Forest, 290 F. Supp. 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) ; Local 7,
Bricklayers, Masons and Plasterers v. Bowen, 278 F. 271 (S.D. Tex. 1922);
Edrington v. Hall, 168 Ga. 484, 148 S.E. 403 (1929) ; Summers, Part One: Internal
Relations Between Unions & Their Members, 18 RUTGERS U.L. REv. 236, 271
(1964).
' Parks v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir. 1963).
'8 Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70
YALE L.J. 175, 200 (1960). Professor Summers says that courts use such tactics in
about two thirds of the discipline cases where they grant relief.
2
I1d.
0Aaron, The Labor-Manzafement Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959, 73
HAgv. L. REv. 851, 873-74 (1960).
" The union constitution in Falcone specifically excluded charging parties from
the union tribunal. 420 F.2d at 1161 n. 5.
" 314 F.2d 886 (4th Cir. 1963).
30 Id. at 901.
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functions separate, federal courts have not been authorized to restructure
disciplinary procedures. It applied the same standard for eliminating bias
that was used in Falcone:
Courts, federal courts especially, are justified in ruling a union tribunal
biased only upon a demonstration that it has been substantially actuated
by improper motives-in other words, only upon a showing of specific
prejudice.34
Unfairness related to merger of prosecutorial and adjudicative func-
tions, however, could be easily corrected compared with the unfairness
that arises from intra-political realities. Falcone is typical of cases in-
volving political conflict between minority and "establishment" groups
within the union, 5 and in these disputes, bias can be even more subtle
than in cases dealing with the merger problem. Where relief has been
given in such cases, courts have reversed the tribunals on substantive
grounds33 or at least given a close reading to the evidence.3 7 In general
they have not attacked the procedural mechanisms directly. In a recent
case"3 a union member, convicted by the tribunal of making defamatory
statements about union officials, claimed he was denied the right to a fair
hearing under the LMRDA because his accusers were business agents
having substantial power within the union. The court upheld the tribunal,
pointing out that such officials were vested with the "responsibility for
", Id. at 913. The court in Parks alluded to the non-intervention policy which
has proved powerful: "It may well be thought desirable for unions to adopt hearing
procedures that keep trial functions separate, but the federal courts are not em-
powered so to restructure the disciplinary procedures of unions. Id. at 913. Cf.
Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049, 1083
(1951) (implied). In another case in which a union member had been charged
with dereliction of his duties as shop steward, and later convicted, the district
council was the charging body, serving also as the pool for members of the trial
body. The court said that despite the fact that plaintiff claimed that members
of the district council, who served as the trial committee, were "so personally em-
broiled in the bringing or prosecution of the charges as to render the trial unfair"
there was no proof of actual bias and held for the union. Null v. Carpenters Dist.
Council of Houston, 239 F. Supp. 809 (S.D. Tex. 1965).
" Political acts, in the broad sense, can include acts which in any way affect the
legitimacy or influence of groups in power within the union at a particular time.
Since Falcone threatened the will of the union leadership, his acts were "political"
in nature.
88 See, e.g., Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 946 (1963).3 TVars v. International Bhd. of Boilermakers, 320 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1963).
88 Cornelio v. Metropolitan Dist. Council, Bhd. of Carp. & joiners, 243 F. Supp.
126 (E.D. Pa. 1965), affd per curiam, 358 F.2d 728 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 975 (1967).
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the proper administration of union affairs" 9 and thus could possess such
power.
Institutional bias has been most pronounced, perhaps, in disputes con-
cerning affiliation with subversive groups. 40 In Anderson v. Brotherhood
of Carpenters41 the accused had been acquitted of falsely answering ques-
tions concerning communist affiliation on his union membership applica-
tion. Subsequently, however, the international found him guilty, suspend-
ing him from membership. At a second trial, ordered because of irreg-
ularities in the first,' the same chairman served as had served on
the first convicting tribunal, and opposing witnesses were called "our
witnesses" or the "committee's witnesses." Nevertheless, the court
affirmed the second conviction saying, "A reasonable amount of tol-
erance must be accorded lay members of a Committee in conducting a
hearing of this kind when they depart from the conventional standards
usually recognized by a Committee of greater experience."43
It seems clear that the union tribunal is not and probably cannot be
disinterested-the bias is an "inevitable product of the procedure itself."44
The very raison d'etre of the typical union-economic action-decreases
the likelihood of impartiality.45 According to one source, twenty-six, out
of seventy-two, unions designate their local executive boards as the trial
bodies, and these unions represented over five and one-half million
union members in 1959.46 The same study showed that in eighteen
unions, representing approximately four million members, the majority
'° Id. at 129.
Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What Courts Do in Fact, 70 YALE
L.J. 175, 199 (1960).
"59 L.R.R.M. 2684 (D. Minn. 1965).
42 The court found such glaring defects as the tribunal's refusal to allow the
accused to confront or cross-examine either his accusers or adverse witnesses.
Id. at 2685.
" Id. at 2688. In one recent case a union tribunal was found to have been biased
in a disciplinary proceeding where four of the five members of the trial board
(which consisted of the executive committee) had been political opponents of the
accused. The bias found, however, was actual and not at all subtle. Gulickson v.
Forest, 290 F. Supp. 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
" Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HAgv. L. Rxv. 1049,
1083 (1951).
" Dealing with a "defamation" case, one court explained:
But the union is not a political unit to whose disinterested tribunals an
alleged defamer can look for an impartial review of his "crime." It is an
economic action group, the success of which depends in large measure on a
unity of purpose and sense of solidarity among its members.
Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1963).
"' L. BROMWICH, UNION CONSTITUTIONs 33 (1959).
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elected tribunals, while in nine, representing approximately three million,
trial board arrangements were left to the discretion of the locals.
47
Control in most unions remains with the dominant political faction,
dealing a blow to the possibility of an unbiased tribunal or internal
democracy.
48
Institutional factors have weighed heavily on intra-union trials and
on the degree of success which the judiciary has had in ferreting out bias.
However, the record in some branches of administrative law suggests that
courts have not been as reluctant to act as they have been in the intra-
union setting. A brief survey of cases in administrative law demonstrates
the greater impact which judicial review has had in that field.
The legislatures in most states delegate to an administrative tribunal
the power to hear and resolve charges against physicians as well as to
revoke licenses.49 In an Illinois case,5° a doctor charged with malpractice
for having used a controversial treatment of cancer was tried before a
trial committee comprised of physicians belonging to the American Med-
ical Association, a group long criticizing the accused and the treatment
he prescribed. The accused argued that since all five members of the
committee belonged to the AMA, he could not receive a fair trial. Although
there was no evidence of any specific bias by any member of the tribunal,
the court held for the physician. In another licensing case, State Board
of Chiropractic Examiners v. Hobson,1 the doctor who served as board
chairman in hearings resulting in the revocation of the defendant's license
was disqualified because he was married to the licensee's former wife.
The court reasoned, by analogizing to the relationship a juror would
have to a litigant, that members of administrative tribunals have just
as high a duty to insure against bias as jurors. 2
In a case involving the disciplining of a cadet for having led an
unauthorized "mass movement" at a merchant marine academy, the
student asserted that members of the panel awarding the demerits had
participated in the initial investigation. 3 He argued that because the
" Id. The study showed that eight unions allowed the president of the local
to select the trial board, six provided that the local meeting was the trial board,
and three had no formal provisions.
," Id. at 35.
"9 41 Am. JuR. Physicians & Surgeons § 58 (1942).
"0 Smith v. Department of Reg. & Educ., 412 Ill. 332, 106 N.E.2d 722 (1952).
" 71 Dauphin County 234 (1958), cited in Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 1210, 1218
(1964).
'd.
"Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967).
[Vol, 49
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authorities merged the functions of policeman and judge, he was deprived
of an unbiased tribunal and fair hearing. The court agreed and added,
"It is too clear to require argument or citation that a fair hearing pre-
supposes an impartial trier of fact and that prior official involvement in
a case renders impartiality most difficult to maintain."54
Similarly, courts have moved with dispatch to eradicate bias in labor-
management disputes. In one NLRB case the respondents opposed a
petition to enforce certain orders because the trial was conducted by a
"biased and partisan examiner who started out with a fell and partisan
purpose to convict." '55 The court, in vacating the order, enunciated a
rigorous standard for impartiality:
[A] fair trial by an unbiased and non-partisan trier of the facts is of
the essence of the adjudicatory process as well when the judging is done
in an administrative proceeding by an administrative functionary as
when it is done in a court by a judge. Indeed, if there is any difference,
the rigidity of the requirement that the trier be impartial and uncon-
cerned in the result applies more strictly to an administrative adjudica-
tion where many of the safeguards which have been thrown around
court proceedings have, in the interest of expedition and a supposed
administrative efficiency been relaxed.56
The judiciary has attempted to transport administrative standards
into union disciplinary situations, but this has been notably unsuccessful,
partly because the average union member is not experienced, as are many
administrative officers, in trial procedure. 57  Furthermore, Congress'
" Id. at 813 (emphasis added).
" NLRB v. Phelps, 136 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1943).
" Id. at 563. See Long Beach Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home
Loan Bank Bd., 189 F. Supp. 589 (S.D. Cal. 1960) for a more recent case which
follows the quoted standard. In that decision the court relied on constitutional
precepts:
It may be said . . . that the right to an impartial judge or quasi-judicial
officer, free from bias, prejudice, interest or other ground of disqualification,
is a fundamental right, protected by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment ....
Id. at 610.
" According to Professor Summers, courts, in trying to eliminate bias, have
instead compounded the problems by importing administrative law standards into
the labor law. He has noted the difficulties encountered because courts have relied
on administrative law precepts:
[T]he union tribunal is always composed of members who are... interested,
if not prejudiced, parties. They have no independence, no expertise, and no
restraining tradition. To this type of tribunal the courts have attempted to
apply standards designed to govern administrative agencies composed of ex-
perienced and impartial triers of fact .... The presumption of regularity
1970]
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mandate that unions be free of excessive government intervention as well
as the peculiarities of unions as economic units in a highly competitive
society have made it unlikely that the judiciary will solve the problem of
union bias. It is evident that the standard subscribed to by the Falcond
court-demanding a demonstration of actual bias-is wholly ineffectual.
The higher standard implicit in Judge Freedman's concurring opinion
would involve more intensive judicial surveillance and participation in
union affairs because the court would virtually serve as a reforming agent.
Since Congress has negated any kind of judicial intervention that would
reshape institutions, and has instead encouraged a laissez-faire approach,
it is doubtful that Judge Freedman's more exacting standard could be
achieved.
Perhaps the most encouraging alternative for realizing the truly un-
biased tribunal lies outside of the court system in the concept of in-
dependent, public review. Initially used by the Upholsterer's International
Union, this procedure was adopted by the constitutional convention of
the United Auto Workers' Union in 1957.58 The UAW Public Review
Board is made of seven "impartial persons of good public repute,"50
appointed by the UAW president, subject to the approval of both
the executive board and the convention." In disciplinary cases the mem-
ber must first exhaust the internal remedies of the union, including appeal
to the international executive board. If he is dissatisfied, he may then
appeal either to the Public Review Board or to the UAW convention, but
not to both.
What is significant is not the specific procedure followed by the UAW
but the wide ramifications this system holds for unions, individual mem-
bers and for society. The review board is neither an instrument of the
union administration nor of the government-it is public. Moreover, it
is voluntary. Independent review separates the executive power and the
applicable to administrative bodies cannot safely be applied to a union trial
committee ....
Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. RaV. 1049, 1083
(1951).
" See Oberer, Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor: Some Reflections, 58
Mica. L. REv. 55, 56 (1959).
59UAW CONST., art. 31, §§ 1, 2.
J . STIEBER, W. OBERER, M. HARRINGTON, DEmocRAcY & PUBLIC REVIEW 10-11
(1960). Senator McClellan, chairman of the Select Committee to Investigate Im-
proper Activities in Labor-Management Relations, proposed independent final review
during debate on the labor legislation in 1959, but his proposal was rejected. See,
e.g., Rothman, Legislative History of the "Bill of Rights" for Union Members, 45
MINN. L. REv. 199, 216 (1960).
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ultimate judicial power within the union, making the dominant faction in
the union subject to some superior law. It also eliminates the need for
judicial review insofar as detecting bias is concerned since such review
bodies act not only as arbiters of unresolved disputes but also as watch-
dogs over the union's internal disciplinary mechanisms. The attributes
of public review would appear to best circumvent the institutional peculiari-
ties of the union.
Dr. Clark Kerr, one of the original members of the UAW's Public
Review Board, summarized the broader problem succinctly:
The union, like every other major institution in an increasingly in-
dustrialized nation, has become more distant from its members. In the
process of centralization the union administration has tended to take on
a life and power of its own. The individual member remains the
theoretical source of authority within the organization, but in a struggle
with his own officers he is, more often than not, unable to muster the
resources to make his sovereignty meaningful. The odds are with the
administration.61
While independent judiciaries would not totally eliminate bias from union
proceedings, they would help reverse the odds. Independent review would
remind union leadership of the importance of due process principles as
applied to internal institutions, and in this respect would strengthen exist-
ing disciplinary apparatus. It would also make evident to all members
the close relationship that exists between the ends of justice and the means
by which they are attained. 2 The correlation between union democracy
and union strength is obvious, and only when more union leaders demon-
strate the courage and wisdom to abdicate some of their own power to in-
dependent review bodies will union members receive the "full and fair
hearing" guaranteed by the LMRDA.
GARBER A. DAVIDSON, JR.
Landlord and Tenant-Recent Erosions of Caveat Emptor in the
Leasing of Residential Housing
The maxim caveat emptor has threaded a path through many areas of
the law. While major modifications have occurred in some areas,' this
" DEMOCRACY & PUBLIC REVIEW, supra note 60, at 3.
02 Id. at 30-31.
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL. CODE §§ 2-314, -315; see 8 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
1970]
